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THE COMPENSATION PRINCIPLE
IN PRIVATE LAW
Jeffrey Berryman*
While the compensation principle has occupied a central position in
modern private law, changing views of adequate conipensation have
worked to modify its application across jurisdictions. Further,
economic instrumentalist accounts have dismissed both the
compensation principle and the influence of justice accounts in
remedies law. In seeking to identify a more modern notion of the
compensation principle,this Article suggests ways to merge elements of
corrective and distributive justice into the compensation principle,
without having to embrace economic instrumental concepts. In
examining Anglo-Canadian common law jurisprudence, the
compensation principle appears to be grounded upon the modern
judicial desire to embrace a more regulatory role over affairs governed
by private law. From a distinctly remedialperspective, it is legitimate
for courts to advance some goals of distributivejustice, while adhering
to a formalist account of corrective justice as governing judicial
practices. This approach will enable courts to prevent unjust
distribution of entitlements while avoiding the pitfalls of excessive
judicialactivism.

INTRODUCTION

Thirty years ago, it would have been highly unlikely that a
female who suffered a catastrophic personal injury as a result of
some tortious conduct would have received significant compensation
for her loss of working capacity above poverty level income rates.
Similarly, even ten years ago, it would have been highly improbable
that a woman who could no longer bear children as a result of a
tortious medical procedure could have raised her ethnic or cultural
practices to justify a higher level of compensation because those of
her ethnicity or culture place a far greater importance to child rearing
than the dominant society around her. Yet, today, our tort law
* Professor of Law, University of Windsor, Canada.
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assessment principles recognize both claims and award higher levels
of compensation as a result.' In both examples, our substantive
concept of tort law has not changed; both actions depend upon
negligence in some shape and form, only the notion of what
constitutes compensation has changed.
As will be developed below, current, dominant private law
theorists have written little on the compensation principle; their focus
being almost exclusively on substantive explanations of tort,
contract, and unjust enrichment. Scholars who write about remedies
obviously spend more time on the compensation principle; it being a
distinctly remedial concept. These same scholars note the changes in
Canadian society built upon arguments of gender equality and
multiculturalism and examine how this discourse impacts damage
awards. This process is seeing law through the remedial perspective;
its proponents are sometimes called dualist, and its antagonists deride
the practice as discretionary remedialism.2 The remedial perspective
acts as a filter in the development of the common law. It is a way
through which our private common law can correct the injustices that
may result from other distributional forces. The common law is
selective about which injustices it corrects and when it corrects them.
In each of the examples above, over a period of years, something
occurred that warranted a change in outcome. At some point in time,
the recognition of equality necessitated a change in the constituent
elements of the claim. For example, some courts now conceive the
claim for lost income as either a claim for loss of working capacity
or loss of opportunity for other remunerative work. Additionally, this
recognition leads to a change in the levels of damages paid, such as
using gender-neutral income tables instead of gendered ones. The
remedial perspective seeks to identify the observations and evidence

1. See MacCabe v. Westlock Roman Catholic Separate Sch. Dist. No. 110, [1998] 226 A.R.
I (Can.) (awarding $173,000 to mother of child rendered quadriplegic in a gym class accident for
additional services rendered to her child as a result of the injury), rev'd, [2001] 293 A.R. 41
(Can.), rev'd on other grounds, [2003] 320 A.R. 194 (Can.); Adan v. Davis, [1998] 43
C.C.L.T.2d 262 (Can.) (justifying $80,000 award to woman who was sterilized by her doctor
without informed consent on account of the heightened importance of fertility in her culture).
2. See generally Michael Tilbury, Remedies and the Classification of Obligations, in THE
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS: CONNECTIONS AND BOUNDARIES II (Andrew Robertson ed., UCL Press
2004) (referencing the arguments of the protagonists).
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necessary to justify such a change in a manner consistent with the
incremental development that is a core value of our common law.'
The compensation principle was elegantly articulated by Lord
Blackburn in Livingstone v. Rawyards Coal Co.,4 and that statement

has since become foundational in all Commonwealth common law
jurisdictions with respect to the goals of contract and tort damages.
The authoritative text on damages in the United Kingdom, McGregor
on Damages, recognizes the pre-eminent position of Lord
Blackburn's passage, describing it as "a statement of the general rule
from which one must always start in resolving a problem as to the

measure of damages" and as one which has "been consistently
referred to or cited with approval" and "stood the test of time."5
Similarly, the leading text in Australia describes Lord Blackburn's
statement as an embodiment of the compensation principle, one that

is the "fundamental principle" and the "dominant rule" and must be

"uppermost in the court's mind."6 In New Zealand, the leading text
gives similar deference to Baron Parke's and Lord Blackburn's
statements.' A slightly different approach prevails in Canada: a
leading remedies casebook opens with Lord Blackburn's dicta under

3. On a number of occasions, the Supreme Court of Canada has discussed transformation in
the common law and its methodology in approaching such issues. See, e.g., Garland v.
Consumers' Gas Co., [2004] 1 S.C.R. 629 (Can.) (using unjust enrichment to refund late fees
assessed by utility company that exceeded statutory limits); Peel (Reg'l Municipality) v. Can.,
[1992] 3 S.C.R. 762, 785 (Can.) (denying recovery of expenses paid by municipality in providing
care for delinquent children on account of a lack of benefit received by federal government).
4. According to Lord Blackburn:
I do not think there is any difference of opinion as to its being a general rule that,
where any injury is to be compensated by damages, in settling the sum of money to be
given for reparation of damages you should as nearly as possible get at that sum of
money which will put the party who has been injured, or who has suffered, in the same
position as he would have been in if he had not sustained the wrong for which he is
now getting his compensation or reparation.
Livingstone v. Rawyards Coal Co., (1880) 5 App. Cas. 25, 39 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Scot.)
(U.K.) (Lord Blackburn, concurring); see also Robinson v. Harman, (1848) 154 Eng. Rep. 363,
365 (Exch. Div.) (providing another frequently cited example of the compensation principle:
"where a party sustains a loss by reason of a breach of contract, he is ... to be placed in the same
situation, with respect to damages, as if the contract had been performed").
5. HARVEY MCGREGOR, MCGREGOR ON DAMAGES 12-13 (17th ed. 2003).

6.

1 MICHAEL TILBURY, CIVIL REMEDIES: PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL REMEDIES

§§ 3032, 3035

(1990).

7. See PETER BLANCHARD ET AL., CIVIL REMEDIES IN NEW ZEALAND 91 n.29 (2003)
(explaining goals of contract and tort law, respectively).
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the heading of "General Principles of Damages,"8 but other leading
texts adopt a more nuanced approach. S.M. Waddams includes
specific reference to Lord Blackburn and Baron Parke under his
chapter on "Damage to Economic Interests."9
The place of the compensation principle in U.S. accounts on
damages is altogether different. The two leading damages texts, one
by Dan Dobbs and the other by James Fischer, reiterate the general
thrust of the compensation principle as articulated above but note
that it is tempered by other instrumental goals that courts pursue
when awarding damages." Thus, these U.S. commentators (Fischer
in particular) suggest reasons why under or overcompensation may
be desirable: undercompensation to encourage defendants to
undertake the risk-incurring behaviour or to give an incentive to
plaintiffs to purchase insurance, and overcompensation to deter
defendants where there is a risk of under-detection of wrongdoing.
The compensation principle has occupied a central position in
modern private law. It serves both as a justification for allowing
parties to commence actions before the court and granting particular
remedies, as well as a control on the powers of the courts. But its
justificatory and limiting roles are becoming frayed. What explains
8.

JEFFREY BRUCE BERRYMAN ET AL., REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 3 (5th

ed.

2006).

9. S.M. WADDAMS, THE LAW OF DAMAGES §§5.20, 5.30 (4th ed. 2004).
10. DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES, EQUITY, RESTITUTION 277-88 (2d ed.

1993); JAMES M. FISCHER, UNDERSTANDING REMEDIES 26-27 (2d ed. 2006). Regarding the
purpose of compensatory damages, Fischer explains:
To state that the purpose of compensatory damages is to place the plaintiff in the
position she would have occupied but for the defendant's commission of a legal wrong
is to state both a simple and a complex idea. There is intuitive appeal to the notion that
the plaintiff should not bear a loss imposed on her by another in violation of plaintiff's
legal right or the other's legal duty. Yet, the resolution of the issue is maddeningly

difficult.
Determining the proper measure of compensation also implicates a social policy
calculus. Should compensation strive to exactly measure the plaintiff's loss; should it
undercompensate to encourage conduct engaged in by the defendant; or, should it
overcompensate because of underdetection of wrongdoing. Should compensation be
set, in situations when insurance is available, at the amount a rational person would
deem prudent to insure against the loss or should compensation be based on the
defendant's moral duty to make the person, whom the defendant has harmed, whole?
Should compensation restore the plaintiff to her pre-injury position or should the
plaintiff be rehabilitated in light of changes to the plaintiff caused or resulting from the
legal wrong?
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these divergent approaches across common law jurisdictions? An
obvious justification is the predominant jurisprudential theory
underlying an account of private law. In Part A of this Article, I
sketch these theories and the role accorded the compensation
principle in these accounts. In economic instrumentalist accounts,
the compensation principle is dismissed. In justice accounts,
although it plays a significant role, surprisingly little is said on the
compensation principle. In Part B, I suggest that, at least in AngloCanadian common law jurisprudence, the compensation principle is
becoming frayed in a number of ways and that its continued
usefulness is being compromised by a judicial desire to embrace a far
more regulatory role over affairs governed by private law. In Part C,
I construct an attenuated instrumental account using the
compensation principle to bridge the structural features of corrective
justice with the socially-demanded distributive justice. I suggest
that, through the distinctly remedial perspective, it is legitimate for
courts to advance some goals of distributive justice, while still
adhering to a formalist account of corrective justice as governing
judicial practices. By doing so, the courts can avoid the pitfalls of
excessive judicial activism. This argument is obviously heretical to
many, akin to trying to fit square pegs into round holes, but I posit it
answers the following conundrum: how can a court claim to be
acting justly if it orders compensation that simply perpetuates an
obviously unjust distribution of entitlements?11
A. ELOQUENT ABSTRACTIONS

Peter Cane has recently canvassed the dominant theoretical
accounts of private law and divided them into three strands of
theory, 2 which I will term justice, economic instrumentalist, and
consequentialist accounts. Justice accounts, of which corrective
justice is the predominant strain, have in common some sense of
objective norm against which justice is administered. That norm can
be inspired by the divine, posited by the state, or found in some
11. This is neither a heretical nor uncommon approach for the law of remedies to adopt.
Consider the role that remedies have played in crystallizing the new understanding of the
performance interest in contract or the discussion about compensatory and suspended injunctions
in nuisance actions that impact the exclusivity of real property. Similarly, the discussion over
remedial constructive trusts has transformed our understanding of common law cohabitation.
12. See Peter Cane, The Anatomy of Private Theory: A 2 5 'h Anniversary Essay, 25 O.J.L.S.
203 (2005).

96
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metaphysical concept of personhood. Economic instrumentalist
accounts, of which law and economics is the predominant strain,
explain law as serving some other purpose (e.g., efficiency).
Consequentialist accounts, such as critical theory and feminist
theory, are outgrowths of the realist movement and see law as a
product of other social phenomena.
Economic Instrumentalism

Cane asserts, with little disagreement, that the economic
instrumentalist account has found its greatest support in the United
States. 3 He attributes this to a "distinctively American style of
individualist ideology" and a strong instrumental strand in American
legal scholarship. 4 I suspect that it is another attempt to find
overarching organizing principles in a country with fifty distinct
common law jurisdictions, and it appeals in the same way that
Blackstone's Commentaries and the great glossators that gave birth
to the Restatement movement did.
There are many criticisms of economic instrumentalist
approaches. 5 Cane faults the theory on its technicality and
inaccessibility to lawyers, its parochial concern with efficiency and
wealth maximization as explanatory and prescriptive criteria, and its
lack of an appropriate theory on the role of adjudication and the
actors within the legal system.' 6 Even proponents of economic
instrumentalism confirm Cane's first and second criticisms. Richard
Craswell, a proponent of economic instrumentalism, unintentionally
confirms Cane's first and second criticisms. In a symposium
devoted to compensatory damages, Craswell suggests that the second
wave of law and economics scholarship has illuminated varying
goals through which efficiency may be pursued to effect deterrence. 7
This argument is in contrast to the old view proffered by first-wave
13. Id. at 204.
14. Id. (quoting NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 418 (1995)).

15. Id. at203-05.
16. See id.; see also STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY 132-36 (2004) (adopting the

same approach in his criticizing economic instrumental accounts for their lack of transparency).
17. Richard Craswell, Instrumental Theories of Compensation, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1135,
1149-71 (2003). Craswell discusses the impact of different remedial schemes upon the efficiency
of insurance, the efficiency of incentives for victims to modify behaviour, the efficiency of
incentives for wrongdoers to take precautions prior to contract formation and to take precautions
to reduce risk of a probabilistic harm, and the efficiency of enforcement costs. Id.
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theorists who argued that pursuit of the compensation principle did
amount to efficient deterrence. 8 The fruit of Craswell's research is
that the compensation principle has no role to play in economic
instrumentalism. 9 Economic instrumentalism is indifferent to the
plaintiffs actual compensation because it is focused on determining
the right incentives to deter forms of behaviour." It seeks to find the
optimal outcome of incentives and insurance to produce "best
effects," 2 ' a calculation that Craswell asserts is theoretically possible
but "may be too complex to be humanly manageable, at least in the
present state of our knowledge."2
Cane's third criticism reflects the early work of Jules Coleman23
and Benjamin Zipursky.24 They argue that because economic
instrumentalism is focused upon deterrence, it is forward-looking in
its mapping of private law and civil litigation. The event triggering
the action is a sunk cost.25 Going forward, an instrumentalist account
needs to determine the best risk avoider or the best insurer at the
least cost. This inquiry uses the victim and wrongdoer in a
representative capacity and turns what has usually been regarded as a
bilateral private action into a multilateral public action. The reason
to give anything to the victim is simply to provide an incentive to
bring the harm-causing loss forward, so a court may administer its
optimal deterrence function. The reason for making the wrongdoer
pay is that the cost of identifying other possible risk avoiders or
insurers is too high. But, there is no inextricable link between victim
and wrongdoer; all that is created is described by Coleman and
18. Id. at 1148.
19. See id. at 1136 (describing opposition to the theory that compensatory remedies promote
efficiency).
20. Id. at 1146-47.
21. Id. at 1178.
22. Id. at 1137.
23. See generally JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 374-75 (1992); JULES L.
COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENCE OF A PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL

THEORY 16 (2001) [hereinafter COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE] (discussing the inability
of economic instrumentalism to account for the structure of tort law as effectively as corrective
justice does).
24. See generally Benjamin C. Zipursky, Philosophy of Private Law, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (Jules L. Coleman & Scott Shapiro
eds., 2002) (arguing that legal theorists should incorporate the concept of a private right of action
into their studies of the traditional theories of deterrence and corrective justice).
25. See id.; see also COLEMAN, RISK AND WRONGS, supra note 23, at 374-75; COLEMAN,
THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 23, at 16-17.

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:91

Zipursky as a contingent relationship. Damages become a fine rather
than compensation, and private law adjudication becomes public law
regulation.26
CorrectiveJustice Models
Chief amongst justice theorists is the work of Ernest Weinrib
and Jules Coleman on the role and place of corrective justice.
Weinrib's enterprise to explain all of private law is much more
expansive than that of Coleman, who offers corrective justice only as
a theory of tort law. 27 To understand the place of the compensation
principle in these accounts of private law requires a modest review of
the theory's underlying tenets.
Under a corrective justice critique, justice is either corrective or
distributive. Corrective justice governs the normative relationship
between one individual and another, while distributive justice
governs the web of interconnected relationships of a society.
Consider two parties, A and B, held together in a single relationship
represented by a balance scale. If B takes something from A, the
balance scale tips in favour of B. In a normative sense (and in this
example, in an arithmetic sense as well), B has more rights than A.
This imbalance can be corrected by either restoring to A precisely
what B has taken, or by adding to A from some other source double
the amount taken by B from A, so both are again equal, although both
enriched. It could also be corrected by taking from B both the
amount wrongfully taken from A, and another equivalent amount, so
both are left equal, although both similarly impoverished when
measured against their respective starting positions. The first
mentioned approach is corrective justice; the engagement of some
third party, either to top A up or to punish B, engages distributive
justice. Proponents of corrective justice do not challenge the right of
legislatures to engage in distributive justice. 8 However, they do
challenge the right of courts charged with administering justice
between individuals according to common law standards of justice to

26. See COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS, supra note 23, at 374-75; COLEMAN, THE
PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 23, at 16-17; Zipursky, supra note 24, at 624-25.
27. See COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS, supra note 23, at 303-04.
28. Mark M. Hager, The Emperor's Clothes Are Not Efficient: Posner s Jurisprudenceof
Class, 41 AM.U.L. REv. 7, 27-28 (1991).
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do the same.2 9 Thus, Weinrib argues that the common law governing
private ordering can be explained as a just and principled set of
normative rights in which each individual is linked correlatively to
each other when they are brought together through contract or the
commission of some wrongdoing. °
Expressed in this way,
corrective justice hangs on three elements: the categorical nature of
corrective and distributive justice, the correlativity between victim
and wrongdoer, and the necessary measurement of correction.
There is an obvious semantic explanation to the categorical
nature of corrective and distributive justice: what is not correction is
distribution, and what is not distribution is correction. But beyond
this, why accounts of private common law must be exclusively
corrective is an expression of what it means to be just. While it is
open for legislatures to impose a distributive scheme of entitlements
and to empower courts to administer the same, it is impermissible for
courts themselves to effect the same in the guise of administering the
common law and to claim they are acting justly. Legitimacy, and the
justness of legislative schemes is determined on constitutional
grounds. The justness of the common law as embodying a set of
normative principles of behaviour must be measured against some
other indicium of morality to claim that it is just. For Weinrib, that
moral compass is derived from Kantian philosophy centering on the
concepts of personality, equality, and the interdiction that enjoins us
to treat every human being as an end, not as a means.31 For
Coleman, the moral compass is justice as fairness.32
29. ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 211 (1995).
30. See, e.g., id. at 114-44; Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice in a Nutshell, 52 U.
TORONTO L.J. 349, 352-54 (2002) [hereinafter Weinrib, CorrectiveJustice in a Nutshell]; Ernest
J. Weinrib, Correlativity, Personality, and the Emerging Consensus on Corrective Justice, 2
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 107, 116-19 (2001) [hereinafter Weinrib, Correlativity]; Ernest J.
Weinrib, The Gains and Losses of Corrective Justice, 44 DUKE L.J. 277, 280-82 (1994)
[hereinafter Weinrib, Gains andLosses].
31. Weinrib describes personality as:
Among these rights are the right to the integrity of one's body's as the organ of
purposive activity, the right to property in things appropriately connected to an external
manifestation of the proprietor's volition, and the right to contractual performance in
accordance with the mutually consensual exercises of the parties' purposiveness.
Weinrib, CorrectiveJustice in a Nutshell, supra note 30, at 354. Weinrib also notes that equality
is of normative rights, not of property and things. Id. at 292. Furthermore, Weinrib states:
Corrective justice treats the parties as equals because all self-determining beings,
regardless of rank or character, have equal moral status. The conjunction of right and
duty is simply this equality of self-determining beings viewed juridically, from the
standpoint of the correlativity of one person's action and its effects on another.
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The heavy work, more so for Weinrib than for Coleman,33 in
corrective justice accounts is done in the concept of correlativity
between victim and wrongdoer. For Weinrib, a person endowed with
dignity, equality, and personality lives in a web of interconnected
relationships described in terms of rights and duties.34 A wrongdoer
creates a normative imbalance with respect to the victim when he
takes from or causes harm to the victim in violation of a victim's
right and the correlative wrongdoer's duty.
Coleman's account of correlativity builds upon what he terms a
pretheoretical distinction over the causes of life's misfortunes, either
at the hands of some human agency or no one's agency.35 Justice
may require that the victim of any of life's misfortunes warrants
some compensation to repair the harm, but we have traditionally
looked to distributive societal practices in the case of the latter and
corrective justice in the case of the former. Fairness values personal
responsibility. It may require us to bear our own losses where we are
authors of our own misfortune (although here again, we may look to
some distributive scheme to repair our loss), but it also requires
others who are responsible for our misfortune to make repair.
Coleman accounts correlativity as a correction of a factual imbalance
that links a duty to repair for wrongful losses to those whose actions
are responsible for the loss, what Coleman calls, agent-specific (or
agent-relevant) reasons for acting.36 Coleman's formulation seeks to
explain more of tort law and to disengage it from a need to find some
moral failing in the wrongdoer. Thus, the fact that the injury is as a
result of some human agency is important, but so is the fact that the
duty to repair can derive from both a wrong (breach of duty) and
Weinrib, Gains and Losses, supra note 30, at 292. see also Ernest J. Weinrib, CorrectiveJustice,
77 IOWA L. REV. 403, 421-24 (1992) (discussing the three reasons underlying the distinctiveness
of corrective justice).
32. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 23, at 43, 54-63.
33. See generally WEINRIB, supra note 29 (offering corrective justice as a theory of private
law (tort, contract, and unjust enrichment)). See also COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE,
supra note 23. Coleman offers corrective justice only as a theory of tort law, and even there, only
at a mid-level or pragmatic approach. His theory is both descriptive and prescriptive. If it can
account for most of tort law, it serves a valuable function in giving prescriptive content to further
developments.
34. Weinrib, Correlativity,supra note 30, at 122-24.
35. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 23, at 44.
36. See COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS, supra note 23, at 324, 329-60; Jules L. Coleman,
The Practiceof CorrectiveJustice, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 15, 17 (1995).
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or impermissible injuring of others'
wrongdoing (unjustifiable
37

legitimate interests).
Both Weinrib's and Coleman's accounts of corrective justice
require identification of the correlative rights and duties (Weinrib) or

forms of wrongs and wrongdoing (Coleman), and, not unnaturally,
this is where their attention has been drawn.38

Resting on a

normative, rather than material or factual imbalance, Weinrib has no
need to provide an account of the measures of correction. 9 Even so,
the subject has engaged him to the extent that he has argued that both
gains-based damages and punitive damages are not consistent with a

corrective justice account.4" Given Coleman's account of corrective
37. See COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS, supra note 23, at 324, 329-60.
38. There are major issues on how to account for causation where the defendant's
responsibility is sufficient to satisfy a "but for" test but where other conditions clearly have been
necessary to bring victim and wrongdoer together. Issues over strict liability and probabilistic
harm also raise conceptual difficulty. See Zipursky, supra note 24, at 627-3 1.
39. Weinrib has commented on the measure of damages:
Finally, damages represent in monetary terms (to the extent that such a
representation is possible) the injustice committed by the defendant upon the plaintiff.
Through the mechanism of the damage award, a qualitatively unique moral event (the
particular injustice done and suffered) receives the quantitative expression that enables
it to be reversed through a monetary transfer. Since the injustice involves the
infringement of a right, and the damages are a means of undoing that injustice, the
damages are the notional equivalent at the remedial stage of the right that has been
wrongly infringed. Accordingly, the plaintiff is entitled to damages only to the extent
that they quantify the injustice that the plaintiff seeks to correct. A head of damages
that does not reflect the content of the plaintiff's substantive right is literally beyond
his or her entitlement.
See Ernest J. Weinrib, Restitutionary Damages as Corrective Justice, 1 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES
L. 1, 4-5 (2000).
40. Id.; see Ernest J. Weinrib, Punishment and Disgorgement as Contract Remedies, 78
CHI-KENT L. REV. 55, 93-102 (2003) [hereinafter Weinrib, Punishment and Disgorgement].
Weinrib's treatment of the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Whiten v. Pilot Insurance Co.,
[2002] 1 S.C.R. 595, 669-73 (Can.), wherein the court expanded on the criteria in which punitive
damages could be awarded for breach of contract, illustrates practical problems with putting his
In Whiten, the plaintiff was awarded $312,000
corrective justice account into practice.
compensatory damages and $1 million punitive damages against an insurance company that had
refused to pay out on a fire insurance claim and had handled the plaintiffs claim in an egregious
way. Id. In rejecting the notion of punitive damages, Weinrib suggests that the court could have
awarded higher compensatory amounts beyond the claim limits of $312,000, based upon the
court's finding that the insurance company had breached an independent obligation of good faith
and disrupted the plaintiffs peace of mind, which was a legitimate expectation held by the
plaintiff when purchasing the policy. See Weinrib, Punishment and Disgorgement,supra, at 93102. Alternatively, the court could have awarded aggravated damages. Weinrib suggests that
compensatory damages for these breaches could have been assessed by the court and would have
taken the plaintiffs compensation above the policy limit. Id. Weinrib goes on to state that such
damages would have been significantly less than the $1 million punitive damages and that any
aggravated damages would have been less, keeping in mind the established cap on non-pecuniary
losses for personal injury in Canada currently stands at around $280,000. Id. at 98 n. 122.
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justice as a duty to repair for wrongful losses, it is surprising to find
little on the subject of the measure of correction. 4 Like Weinrib,
Coleman is clear that a gain by a wrongdoer is not the subject of
corrective justice.42 Coleman also asserts that being under a duty to
repair and how that duty is discharged are distinct inquiries.4 3 Thus,
it is perfectly acceptable to have a duty to repair derived as a product
of corrective justice, even though its discharge is the outcome of an
insurance policy. 44 Nevertheless, despite the centrality of measures
of correction to the corrective justice critique, it is surprising that
there is little discussion of exactly how damages, as the predominant
form of repair (Coleman), and correction (Weinrib) achieve that
task. 5
Arthur Ripstein, another corrective justice proponent, has
elegantly argued that damages in tort law do operate to make it as if
the "wrong had never happened. '46 Ripstein suggests that tort law
offers an account of duties of conduct owed between individuals in
which the duties protect a person's entitlement to such "means" that
they have against the wrongful interference of others.4 ' To have
"'means" is to have an ability to exercise choice over an achievable

For Weinrib to make these suggestions as to the measure of compensation in this case seems to
demonstrate a certain indeterminacy in quantification, and replaces the measure of correction with
a criteria of proportionality. Ironically, this is the same criteria the Supreme Court of Canada
purported to create in Whiten for punitive damages. 1 S.C.R. 595, 669-73.
41. It is quite surprising that Coleman has devoted so little time to the compensation
principle. Recall that Coleman offers a pragmatic account of tort law and legal theory. His
account seeks to find the best fit of the observable social practices surrounding tort law-wrong,
harm, responsibility, and repair. Unlike Weinrib's normative account, Coleman's carries the
burden of showing what tort law does in meeting a claimant's losses. If claimants are
systematically under or overcompensated, this must have repercussions on any normative account
of tort law that seeks to explain current practices.
42. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS, supra note 23, at 369.
43. Id. at 369-71.
44. Id. at 327.
45. For example, increasingly in different areas of law, the role that dignity plays in human
relationships is being formulated, and its loss and assailment increasingly warrant considerable
compensation. On purely corrective justice grounds, it is difficult to quantify the amount that
such compensation should entail. Dignity operates in a binary fashion, either being held or not
held. To compensate for its loss, one could equally argue for an apology, a fine, a fixed
emolument, or some proportional response. I have discussed some aspects of this in Jeffrey
Berryman, Reconceptualizing Aggravated Damages: Recognizing the Dignitary Interest and
Referential Loss, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1521, 1542-49 (2004).
46. Arthur Ripstein, As if It Had Never Happened,48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1957, passim
(2007).

47. Id. at 1967-69.
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set of "ends."48 Ripstein's argument is that damages, as a legal
concept, are the embodiment of the commensurate duty to repair and
act to restore equivalent means to the victim of wrongdoing.49 This
is an argument that conflates damages and a duty to repair at one
end, and a commensurate duty governing conduct at the other. Yet it
is still a normative account that simply masks the important issue of
how the measure of damages (correction), the pith and substance of
the compensation principle, is to be affected.
Part of a purposive life is the right to determine the point at
which one converts their individual "means" into a monetary
equivalent." That time is when the subjective value accorded a
person's means is made objective in a market price. Presumably, at
that time and absent any coercion, subjective and objective values
are commensurate. Wrongdoing eliminates the exercise of this
choice and forces the victim and wrongdoer to accept what a court
assesses as damages to restore the victim's means?2 There can be,
and often is, a wide disparity in the valuation of these damages that
are based not on differing evidential foundations, but on the
conceptualization of what has actually been lost.
Consider the valuation of the loss experienced by an injured
homemaker. Canadian courts have at various times quantified these
losses under very different conceptions of a homemaker's value: as
being equivalent to a subsistence level of income, the homemaker
not being part of the paid workforce; as being the equivalent to what
it would take to employ substitute homemaking services; or as being
measured by the lost opportunity to utilize victim's talents in paid
employment. 3 Indeed, these valuations seem at odds with other
economic models that value homemakers at considerably higher
levels.54 The choice between these competing measures reflects
48. Id.at 1966-67.
49. Id. at 1964.
50. Id. at 1967.
51. See id. at 1985-86.
52. Id. at 1982.
53. See Fobel v. Dean, [1991] 83 D.L.R.4th 385 (Can.), appealdenied [1992] 87 D.L.R.4th
n. vii (Can.). See also Cara L. Brown, Valuable Services Trends in Housekeeping Quantum
Across Canada, 1990-2001, 27 ADVOCS. Q. 71 (2003).
54. In Fobel v. Dean, the court recognized at least five different approaches to quantifying
the value of a homemaker: replacement of earning capacity, opportunity cost, replacement cost,
substitute homemaker, and catalogue of services. [1991] 83 D.L.R. 4th 385. The choice of
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instrumental thinking on how the law values homemakers and the
services they provide, coincidentally, services that fall
disproportionately on women.
To say then, that damages "serve to make it as if a wrong had
never happened"55 rings hollow if all it can do is address assessment
in normative terms and is incapable of identifying a singularly just
measure of correction to restore the victim's means. Tort law has to
deal with the fact that by and large, the victim's means that form the
subject of tort law are incommensurable and do not engage a
consensual surrendering by victim to wrongdoer.
Peter Cane and Ken Cooper-Stephenson have written critically
of corrective justice accounts of tort law.56 Simply put, their
objection is as to the categorical nature of corrective justice. 7 How
can a theory claim to be just when it operates in total ignorance of
injustice in initial distributional allocation of resources?58 CooperStephenson sees this as the product of an obsession with formal
rights over substantive rights. 9 Cane offers a bifurcated model in
which courts engage in a distributive justice analysis of the allocation
of "risks of harm and obligations to repair harm"6 within society
before determining whether the doer and sufferer are correlatively
linked.6
Cane admits that this explicitly takes courts into new methods of
reasoning, particularly on how to engage theories of distributive
justice, but he suggests this is the only way forward if courts are to
play a role in shaping the direction of tort law.62 For Cooper-

comparators and the time spent on each task by a homemaker can generate wide divergences in
value. For example, in a recent survey of the economic value of homemakers, the value of those
services was placed at over $115,000. Terry Brodie, What's a Mom's Work Worth? Try Six
Figures, GLOBE & MAIL, May 9, 2008, at C2.
55. Id. at 1961.
56. See Peter Cane, Distributive Justice and Tort Law 2001 N.Z. L. REv. 401; Ken CooperStephenson, Corrective Justice, Substantive Equality and Tort Law, in TORT THEORY 48 (Ken
Cooper-Stephenson & Elaine Gibson eds., 1993).
57. Cane, supra note 56; Cooper-Stephenson, supra note 56.
58. Cane, supra note 56, at 405-06 n. 18.
59. Cooper-Stephenson, supra note 56, at 59-63; see also Ken Cooper-Stephenson,
Theoretical Underpinningsfor Reparations: A Constitutional Tort Perspective, 22 WINDSOR
Y.B. ACCESS TO JUST. 3 (2003).
60. Cane, supra note 56, at 407.
61. Id.at 406-07, 413.
62. Id. at413-14.
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Stephenson, for any explanatory account of tort law to be useful it
must both account for and continue to accommodate two powerful
social influences: first, the fact of insurance and second, the
progressive recognition given substantive equality rights. The fact
that the vast majority of torts are now covered by insurance has
emboldened courts and juries to locate their role in a loss shifting
enterprise still largely governed by attribution of fault, but not
fixated on moralistic overtones of individual responsibility. In terms
of substantive equality rights, Cooper-Stephenson includes formal
individual human rights found in domestic legislation, international
treaties, and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,63 as well
as the more general principle of recognition of individual and group
difference, i.e., that to attain true equality, one must go beyond like
treatment of all (formal equality). 4
ConsequentialistModels

Consequentialist theories, of which feminism, critical race
theories, and modernism/postmodernism are some of the most recent
manifestations, have as a common ethos an explanation of why the
haves always come out ahead.65 Consequentialist theorists then
divide into those who believe in keeping the structural elements of
adjudication but wish to transform law so as to encapsulate some
more encompassing and egalitarian notion of justice, and those who
believe that the whole law project is a flawed enterprise, a
duplicitous project in which the powerless have been duped by the
powerful.66 The former provide description but then look to justice
theories for prescription.6" The latter conceive of law as politics,
only written in a different language.68 Consequential accounts of
private law have been influential in illuminating injustices,
particularly where it comes to providing evidence of systemic

63. Canada Act, 1982, c. 11, sched. B, pt. 1 (U.K.) (encompassing the Constitution Act,
1982, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms).
64. See Cooper-Stephenson, supra note 56, at 60.
65. See generally RICHARD W. BAUMAN, CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES: A GUIDE TO THE
LITERATURE (1996); DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION 1st ed. (1997).
66. See BAUMAN, supra note 65; KENNEDY, supra note at 65, at 1-20.
67. See sources cited supra note 65.
68. See sources cited supra note 65.
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discrimination in current compensation principles.69 In doing so, this
work has fuelled the demand to have better theories of private law
that are more inclusive and which provide a better account of the
social practices of the have-nots."
Revenge Model
Emily Sherwin illustrates the discordance between the
compensation principle in tort law as it is practiced and as it is
preached in corrective justice accounts.'
She identifies several
common areas where tort practices invariably under or
overcompensate tort victims and thus deviate from some theorized
compensation principle.72 Drawing from these observations, Sherwin
suggests that the desire for revenge may provide an ancillary account
to supplement the loss adjustment performed under the compensation
principle.73 Indeed, Sherwin suggests that revenge and the desire to
satiate vindictive impulses may supplement the justificatory
processes of restitution and awards of punitive damages.74 Sherwin's
account accepts the notion of correlativity; revenge must be against
someone for something, but it does not need to account for the
measure of compensation.75 The quantification of damages to exact
revenge is more idiosyncratic, depending upon the victim's
psychology, and is only contingently connected to the victim's actual
losses.76
The Law of Court OrdersAccount

Benjamin Zipursky suggests that because neither right nor
remedy is self applying, any account of the rights-remedy axis needs
69. See generally Elizabeth Adjin-Tettey, Replicating and Perpetuating Inequalities in
Personal Injury Claims Through Female-Specific Contingencies, 49 MCGILL L.J. 309 (2004)
(discussing the development of tort remedies to individuals in historically marginalized groups);
Jamie Cassels, (In)Equality and the Law of Tort: Gender, Race, and the Assessment ofDamages,
17 ADVOCS. Q. 158 (1995) (identifying equality issues in tort by referencing gender and race in
personal injury law).
70. See generally sources cited supra note 65.
71. Emily Sherwin, Compensation and Revenge, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1387, 1388-89
(2003).
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

1395.
1397.
1399-401.
1401.

76. Id. at 1403.
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to accommodate the role played by courts and adjudication."
Zipursky triangulates the rights-remedy axis, placing a right of action
at the third point.78 Thus, a right to an action mediates the
relationship between right and remedy.79 Zipursky suggests this
structure can be derived from the Lockean social contract. 8' A civil
society prohibits the private use of coercion and non-consensual
exchanges of property. 8I The right to exercise these functions and
thereby change the legal relationship between individuals is held
exclusively by the state.82 The state exercises these functions
through criminal and public law. It gives access to individuals
through a right to an action (a right to state assistance in changing the
legal relationship between plaintiff and defendant) in order to
exercise these functions in what we commonly understand is private
law.
In a similar vein, Rafal Zakrzewski has also suggested that the
law of remedies can be made stable by thinking of it in terms of a
substantive right to a court order.83 Zakrzewski's project is one of
descriptive taxonomy.84 The law of remedies is to be classified as
either replicating or transforming primary or secondary rights.85
Under this taxonomy, the compensation principle is part of the law of
damages, and the law of damages is a secondary right (e.g., a right to
damages for negligence or breach of contract) that has nothing to do
with the law of remedies so classified.86 Zakrzewski approaches his
subject from the monist point of view. 87 Treating the law of
remedies (in essence, the law of court orders) as a separate
substantive right, he is able to suggest a disciplined, doctrinal
structure to explain how injunctions, equitable compensation,

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
(2003).
84.
85.
86.

Zipursky, supra note 24, at 633.
Id. at 635-36.
Id.
Id. at 637-40.
See id. at 636-38.
Id.
See RAFAL ZAKRZEWSKI, REMEDIES RECLASSIFIED 43-48 (Oxford Univ. Press 2005)
Id. at 43-61.
Id. at 63-84.
Id. at 172.

87. Id. at 43-61.
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damages, specific performance, judicial discretion, etc. are applied.88
Whether this is an advance of dualist approaches remains to be seen.
It certainly casts out much of what has traditionally been thought to
form the substantive content of the law of remedies.
Conceptualizing the law of court orders as a free-standing
substantive right, as Zipursky and Zakrzewski do, has the advantage
of allowing the development of a distinct jurisprudence focussed
upon court adjudication. This preserves the role and legitimacy of
other formalist accounts of substantive rights. It allows the law of
court orders to develop to accommodate other interests other than
rights-balancing accounts without disturbing accounts of pure
substantive rights. Of course, Zakrzewski would refute this as a
function of replicating existing primary or secondary rights, but it
would clearly fall within his category of transformative remedies.89
Zipursky also reluctantly concedes that a right of action in private
law may act instrumentally in engaging choices about what is a
public good.9"
To summarize, economic instrumental accounts ignore the
compensation principle and the need for correlativity. Coleman's
corrective justice account necessitates treatment of the compensation
principle but at present provides little narrative other than what is not
encompassed within the concept, i.e., gain and punishment. 9'
Weinrib reinterprets the compensation principle to give it only a
normative content, although similarly exploring its parameters by
excluding disgorging gain and punishment as normative goals.92
Both corrective justice theorists see correlativity as an essential
characteristic of private law. Likewise, Ripstein accords the concept

88. Id. passim.
89. Id. at 79, 203-17.
90. Zipursky, supra note 24, at 653. Dualists, like Ken Cooper-Stephenson, Principle and
Pragmatism in the Law of Remedies, in REMEDIES: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES 1-47 (Jeffrey
Berryman ed., 1991); Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585 (1983); and
PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS (Yale
Univ. Press 1983), would presumably refute the need to create an account of right, remedy, and
court orders as adding anything to their initial analysis of the right-remedy axis.
91. See COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS, supra note 23, at 374; COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE
OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 24, at 625.
92. See, e.g., WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW, supra note 29, at 114-44; Weinrib,
CorrectiveJustice,supra note 30; Weinrib, Gains and Losses, supra note 30.
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of paying damages a normative function, but ignores what is engaged
in their actual quantification.93
Consequentialist theories address the compensation principle
only in descriptive accounts. Sherwin's revenge account accepts
correlativity but sees only a contingent attachment to the
compensation principle. Zipursky does not directly address the
compensation principle, and Zakrzewski treats it as clearly within the
domain of a secondary substantive right and not part for the law of
remedies. However, both Zipursky and Zakrzewski, although
probably unintentionally, would legitimate instrumental thinking
(i.e., distributive justice) in evaluating what courts may do when
adjudicating on private law rights to award a court order based on
interests." Both accept the principle of correlativity in that a court
order is necessary to change the legal relationship between
individuals.
B. PRACTICAL REALITIES

The compensation principle does not have long historical roots
in common law. It was introduced as a way to provide guidance and
controls over juries, which, prior to its imposition, were likely more
swayed by motives of punishment, deterrence, and consolation.95
However, once introduced, it assumed a pre-eminence, as attested by
the comments accorded by treatise writers outlined earlier, above
most other damages assessment concepts.96 In Anglo-Canadian law,
the compensation principle is now being undermined, not in any
systemic way, but in a piecemeal approach. In other words, its
centrality to private law is threatened by a thousand cuts.
Punitive Damages
To illustrate how the compensation principle is being
undermined, note that the rate of punitive damages claims in both
contract and tort disputes97 increased so dramatically that it led to the
93. Ripstein, supra note 46, at 1961-62.
94. See, Zipursky, supra note 24; ZAKREWSKI, supra note 83.
95. MICHAEL TILBURY ET AL., REMEDIES: COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS 76 (3d ed.

2000).
96. See infra Part A.
97. Bruce Feldthusen, Punitive Damages: Hard Choices and High Stakes, 1998 N.Z. L. REV.

741, 742 (1998).
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Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Whiten v. Pilot Insurance
Co.9 The Supreme Court imposed criteria to guide the award of
punitive damages to insure that they amounted to a proportionate
response to the defendant's conduct.99 One of the essential criteria is
a rationality test in which punitive damages can only be awarded if
the compensatory award is insufficient.'
Thus, an implicit, if not
explicit, function of the compensatory award is to effect punishment
and deterrence.''
Damagesfor Wrongful Dismissal
Additionally, in the area of assessing damages for wrongful
dismissal, the Supreme Court of Canada has allowed the period of
notice for which damages are to be compensated to be extended
where the employer is guilty of breach of an implied term of good
faith dismissal.' 2 The extension of the notice period is unconnected
to any increase in time for which the wrongfully dismissed employee
may have experienced in securing new employment, a quite
foreseeable consequence where an employer exacerbates the
psychological well being of a wrongfully dismissed employee, but is
only connected to the particular egregious conduct of the employer.
The Supreme Court adopted this reasoning to maintain the dubious
distinction between losses that flow from the fact of dismissal, which
are unrecoverable, and losses that flow from the manner of dismissal,
which are recoverable to the extent they are reflected in the increased
length of the reasonable notice period.' 3
Damages related to the manner of dismissal would be outside
the demands of any mitigation concept. Whereas, if the employer's
98. Whiten v. Pilot Ins. Co., [2002] 1 S.C.R. 595 (Can.) (awarding punitive damages against
insurer for its breach of contract and bad faith in refusing to reimburse the insured after a fire had
destroyed his home).
99. Id. 107-26.
100. Id. 123.
101. See id.
111-26; see also Royal Bank of Can. v. W. Got& Assoc. Elec. Ltd., [199913
S.C.R. 408, 29 (Can.) (awarding punitive damages against a company that failed to provide
adequate notice when exercising a right to appoint a receiver, after it had misled the court by
tendering misleading affidavits).
102. Wallace v. United Grain Growers Ltd., [1997] 3 S.C.R. 701, 7 102-09 (Can.).
103. Interestingly, Justice McLachlin (now Chief Justice McLachlin) favored the alternative
approach, viewing any loss recoverable for the manner of dismissal as only being awarded where
it was foreseeable and adversely impacted the employee's ability to secure replacement
employment. Chief Justice McLachlin is the lone champion of the compensation principle on the
Supreme Court of Canada.
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breach of good faith dismissal foreseeably harms the employee's
ability to secure alternative employment, the compensatory damages
would be subject to mitigation, which could either lessen or increase
the award depending upon the reasonableness of the dismissed
employee's response. Wallace damages, as they are now known,
have been described as evidence of the court's ideological movement
towards a "rights" paradigm and away from an "efficiency"
paradigm in labor law."°
CollateralDamages

The compensation principle applied to collateral benefits should
operate to avoid double recovery. This result can be attained by
either favouring a reimbursement approach (subrogation) or a
deductibility approach. Another approach is to simply allow
accumulation and ignore any double recovery. °5 Reimbursement
through exercise of a right of subrogation appears to be an optimal
and principled way to reconcile competing aims of compensation and
Nevertheless, reimbursement has been universally
deterrence.
criticized as an ineffective policy choice, because few subrogees
actually exercise the right of subrogation. 6 This leaves deductibility
as the preferred approach. Chief Justice McLachlin has consistently

104. See generally Brian Etherington, Supreme Court of Canada Decisions and the Common
Law of Employment in the 1990s: Shifting the Balance Between Rights and Efficiency Concerns,
78 CAN. B. REv. 200 (1999); Janice Payne & Ted Murphy, Recent Developments Relating to the
Awarding of Damages within an Employment Law Context: A Unifying Theory, in THE LAW
SOCIETY OF UPPER CANADA SPECIAL LECTURES 2005: THE MODERN LAW OF DAMAGES 465
(2005). Here, the rights paradigm addresses the influx of progressive labor legislation, such as
employment equity, extension of human rights codes, and employment standards, and considers
whether those same progressive notions should also be applied in the context of personal
employment. In contrast, the efficiency paradigm treats labor as simply another commodity
subject to the economic imperatives of supply and demand.
105. See Law Comm'n for Eng. & Wales, Damages for PersonalInjury: Medical, Nursing
and OtherExpenses: CollateralBenefits, Law Com. No. 262, § 11.27, at 134 (1999), availableat
http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/docs/lc262(l).pdf. An argument in support of this approach is that it
provides additional compensation in a system that may grant insufficient or imperfect
compensation when the victim is left exclusively to his or her court award. The U.K. Law
Commission termed this argument the "counsel of despair." Id.
106. See id § 12.15, at 144; ONT. LAW REFORM COMM'N, REPORT ON COMPENSATION FOR
PERSONAL INJURIES AND DEATH 189 (1987); 1 COULTER OSBORNE, REPORT OF INQUIRY INTO
MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT COMPENSATION IN ONTARIO 435 (1988); see also Richard Lewis,
Deducting Collateral Benefits from Damages: Principle and Policy, 18 LEGAL STUD. 15, 33
(1998).
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held to the deductibility approach, °7 and this persistence appears to
have now won some converts among her colleagues, 8 although
there is an equally strong line of support for the reimbursement
approach and expansion of the beneficence and insurance exceptions
to the collateral benefit rule." 9
FiduciaryDuties

Canadian courts have been quick to advance the concept of factbased fiduciaries into new situations."0 The fiduciary concept shifts
the content of the duty owed to the fiduciary along the spectrum
running from selfish (caveat emptor) to selfless (utmost good faith)
behaviour."' The extension of the fiduciary concept into situations
that often mirror tortious negligence has been described as creating a
form of equitable tort jurisdiction."2
This expansion of the duty has also brought with it equity's
methods toward the quantification of equitable compensation.
Although the difference between common law and equitable
compensation is still a matter of debate, there is a general consensus
that the concept of causation and remoteness are more generously
applied in equity.' 3 The rationale for doing so is not altogether clear,

107. Prior to her appointment to the Supreme Court of Canada, Chief Justice McLachlin set
out her views in an article: Beverley M. McLachlin, What Price Disability? A Perspectiveon the
Law of Damagesfor PersonalInjury, 59 CAN. B. REV. 1 (1981).
108. See M.B. v. B.C., [2003] 2 S.C.R. 477 (Can.).
109. Justice McLachlin's position prevailed in Ratych v. Bloomer, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 940
(Can.). In Cunningham v. Wheeler, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 359 (Can.), she was in dissent and the
majority expanded the insurance and beneficence exceptions.
110. See Jeffrey Berryman, Equitable Compensation for Breach by Fact-BasedFiduciaries:
Tentative Thoughts on ClarifyingRemedial Goals, 37 ALTA. L. REV. 95 (1999).
111. Canadian courts have accepted Paul Finn's fiduciary analysis. See Paul Finn, The
Fiduciary Principle,in EQUITY, FIDUCIARIES AND TRUSTS 1 (Timothy G. Youdan ed., 1989);
978011 Ont. Ltd. v. Cornell Eng'g Co., [2001] 53 O.R. (3d) 783 (Can.).
112. But see John McCamus, Prometheus Unbound: Fiduciary Obligation in the Supreme
Court of Canada, 28 CAN. BUS. L.J. 107, 131-36 (1997) (arguing for a much less expansionist
interpretation of the Supreme Court of Canada's cases).
113. For example, in Hodgkinson v. Simms, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 377 (Can.), an accountant
advised his client to minimize taxes by investing in a development company, but failed to
disclose his financial interest in the company. Although the tax advice was sound, the client lost
substantially all of his investment as a result of a general deterioration in the economy and the
residential property market. A divided Supreme Court allowed the client to shift these losses to
the defendant accountant. Id.
82-83.
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particularly where the contents of the duties are similar, but it
appears to be largely related to a desire to punish and deter." 4
DisgorgementRemedies

Actions seeking to disgorge gains made through wrongdoing
have increased in frequency before English and Canadian courts." 5
Thus far, this form of assessment has been common for breach of
fiduciary duty and breach of confidence and, to a lesser extent, the
action of waiver of tort. In the former category, disgorging gains is
justified to discipline the errant fiduciary or fiduciary-like holder. In
the latter category, courts have been stuck with the apparent
incongruous result of allowing a defendant to keep a profit from
wrongdoing where it has been obtained without a commensurate
compensatory loss by the plaintiff.' 16 However, in the majority of all
these cases in both categories, the gain has been through the
appropriation of a property right in situations where the property
owner did not, because of the factual circumstance, or through lack
of desire, have the opportunity to make a commensurate gain." 7
Recently, the disgorgement assessment approach has been applied to
the contract field in Blake, a much publicized decision of the English
House of Lords." 8 In Blake, even though the availability of
disgorgement was limited to those occasions where the plaintiff had
a "legitimate interest in preventing the defendant's profit-making
activity,""' 9 the court's holding amounts to a frontal assault on the
114. In Hodgkinson, the majority applied the standard of causation and remoteness which
would apply if the accountant had committed fraud, despite the fact that there was no evidence of
fraud and the advice provided the desired tax benefit. Id.
115. See, e.g., Bank of Am. Can. v. Mut. Trust Co., [2002] 211 S.C.R. 44 (Can.); Blake v.
Att'y Gen., (2001) 1 A.C. 268, 278-82 (H.L. 2000) (U.K.).
116. See E. L. Olwell v. Nye & Nissen Co., 173 P.2d 652 (Wash. 1946); Inverugie Invs. Ltd.
v. Hackett, [1995] 1 WLR 713 (Bahamas).
117. See Blake, (2001) 1 A.C. at 278-82 (providing an overview of the treatment of the
disgorgement as a remedy by British common law and equity courts and noting that in many
decisions where disgorgement was awarded "the reality is that the injured person's rights were
invaded but, in financial terms, he suffered no loss").
118. Blake, (2001) 1 A.C. 268. Blake planned to author a book detailing his experience as a
counterspy for the Soviet Union while employed by British Intelligence. The Crown sought to
recover from Blake the commission he was to be paid by his publisher. For various reasons, the
only action the Crown had against Blake was breach of employment contract, which did not result
in compensatory loss to the Crown. See John McCamus, Disgorgementfor Breach of Contract:
A Comparative Perspective, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 943 (2003), for an in-depth analysis of the
decision.
119. Blake, (2001) 1 A.C. at 285.
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efficiency theory of contract law and the supremacy of the
compensation principle. Blake is also a case where a disgorgement
approach cannot be explained on property grounds. The court
specifically held that the breach of contract did
not amount to a
12
breach of fiduciary duty or breach of confidence.
If based on the wrongful appropriation of a property right,
disgorgement actions can also be supported on compensatory
grounds, namely as being compensation for violation of an important
incidence of property ownership, the right to exclusive use including
the opportunity for gain. However, an alternative compensatory
justification can be argued, based on the property holder's lost
opportunity to bargain the consensual release of the property
entitlement. This argument was offered in a most persuasive account
by Stephen Waddams and Robert Sharpe. 2 ' However, once freed
from its property orientation, the Waddams-Sharpe approach can be
applied to any act of wrongdoing or breach of contract to justify
disgorgement damages under the guise of compensation. Any
plaintiff can argue that the defendant's wrong has deprived them of
the opportunity to negotiate a consensual release of the right
infringed. To place this in the terms of Calabresi and Melamed,' 22 it
translates all rights protected by liability rules into ones protected by
property rules. This is the very argument accepted by Lord Scott in
an ex curia address to explain the result in Blake as really
constituting a compensatory claim.'23 Such an approach would
amount to a huge expansion of so-called disgorgement damages.
Underlying these developments is a renewed interest in the
morality of breach of contract and tortious wrongdoing. The
compensation principle is largely amoral toward breach of contract
120. Id. at 291-93.

121. See Stephen Waddams & Robert Sharpe, Lost Opportunity to Bargain, 2 O.J.L.S. 290
(1982), which provides an account consistent with the compensatory principle for cases like
Wrotham Park Estates Co. v. Parkside Homes Ltd., (1974) 1 W.L.R. 798 (Ch. 1973) (Eng.). In

Wrotham Park Estates, the court awarded damages for the defendant's breach of a restrictive
covenant, which imposed limits on the development of the property. Id. Although the plaintiffs
did not experience an actual decline in their property value, the court awarded the plaintiff a
percentage of the profit made by the defendant, which amounted to the cost of a release from the
restrictive covenant. Id.
122. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,85 HARV. L. REv. 1089 (1972).

123. Lord Scott of Foscote, Lecture at the Chancery Bar Association Conference at the Royal
College of Physicians (Jan. 20, 2006) available at http://www.chba.org.uk/ldata/
assets/pdf file/0004/35779/LordScott_20jan2006.pdf.
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and tortious wrongdoing.
Disgorgement on the basis that a
wrongdoer should not profit from his or her own wrongdoing
expresses a certain moral preference.
Class Action Litigation
Many provinces in Canada have now enacted class action
legislation. Ontario has one of the most plaintiff favourable acts, the
Class Proceedings Act.' 24
The guiding principle for certification of a class action is
whether the certification will advance the proceedings in accordance
with the goals of judicial economy, access to justice, and
modification of the behaviour of wrongdoers.' 5 As long as
"common issues" can be found that move the proceeding on,
certification will be granted.'26 Distinctions between common issues
of liability and individual issues of damage quantification are
recognized by the Act.'27
The Act also provides a mechanism that allows damage
assessment to be made a common issue and permits statistical and
sampling methods to determine the amount. In addition, provision is
made for an aggregate assessment of monetary relief. Finally, the
Act empowers a court to create expedited processes-use of referees,
simplified methods of proof-to assess and distribute any damage
award. A significant number of class action cases have been brought
where the alleged compensatory damages to any class member
would be negligible and where it would be unlikely that the
claimants would come forward. 2 ' In these cases, the courts have
been happy to invoke their cy pres jurisdiction and have applied the

124. Class Proceedings Act, S.O., ch. 6 (1992).
125. See Hollick v. Metro. Toronto, (2001] 3 S.C.R. 158, 15 (Can.); W. Can. Shopping Ctrs.
Inc. v. Dutton, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 534,
27-29.
126. Under the Class Proceedings Act, "common issues" are defined as "(a) common but not
necessarily identical issues of fact, or (b) common but not necessarily identical issues of law that
arise from common but not necessarily identical facts ....
Class Proceedings Act, S.O., ch. 6, §

I.
127. Section 6 of the Class Proceedings Act specifically states that a court should not refuse
certification simply on the ground that relief claimed includes a claim for damages that would
require individual assessment after determination of the common issues. Id. §6.
128. See e.g., Ford v. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd., [2005] 74 O.R.(3d) 758 (Can.); Tesluk v.
Boots Pharm. PLC, [2002] O.J. No. 1326 (Can.); Alfresh Beverages Can. Corp. v. Hoechst AG,

[2002] O.J. No. 79 (Can.).
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These cases emphasise

PublicLaw

There is increasing ambiguity over the division of public and
private law. Canadian courts have demonstrated some willingness to
give the victim of a constitutional and quasi administrative violation
a damages remedy to vindicate the rights transgressed. 3 '
Sharpe has offered similar evidence as that just mentioned in his
discussion of a tension apparent in Canadian commercial law over
the continued place of the classic market efficiency model and
judicial desire to impose a "code of good commercial conduct."'3 2 In
a similar vein, John McCamus has discussed disgorgement remedies
as engaging the extent to which behavioural modification to prevent
a wrongdoer from profiting from wrong is to play a more significant
role in private law.'33 Both authors' accounts are descriptive rather
than prescriptive. They see these developments as consistent with
129. See Ford, 74 O.R.(3d) 758; TeslukO.J. No. 1326; Aifresh, O.J. No. 79.
130. A most glaring example of this phenomenon is the outcome revolving around the class
action suit brought by Gordon Garland against Consumers' Gas. Garland v. Consumers' Gas Co.,
[2004] 1 S.C.R. 629 (Can.). At issue in this suit was the legality of a late payment fee authorized
by the Ontario Energy Board ("OEB") on consumer's gas bills but which operated in such a way
that it offended the criminal interest rate provisions of the Criminal Code. Id. The result of the
litigation was a $22 million settlement by Consumers' Gas. Jeffrey Berryman, Class Actions
(Representative Proceedings) and the Exercise of the Cy-pres Doctrine: Time for Improved
Scrutiny, in THE LAW OF REMEDIES: NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE COMMON LAW (Jeffrey Berryman
& Rick Bigwood eds.) (forthcoming 2008). Of that amount, the law firm handling the class
action received $10 million, Gordon Garland $95,000, the Ontario Class Action fund $2 million,
and the Winter Warmth Fund $9 million on a cy-pres distribution. Id. The Winter Warmth Fund
is run by the United Way and provides lump sum grants to people, who because of poverty,
cannot pay their home heating bills. Id. The OEB subsequently allowed Consumers' Gas to pass
the $22 million damages judgment on to its consumers in an approved rate increase. Id. The net
impact of this action is that the victims, those who actually paid the offending late payment fee,
received nothing directly. Id. In fact, they had to pay twice. They paid the fee initially and then
again, in the rate increase authorized by the OEB to be passed onto consumers. Id. The class
action fee paid to the law firm, which absorbed nearly half the total award, seems a heavy price to
pay to vindicate the harm caused from the criminal violation.
131. See KEN COOPER-STEPHENSON, CHARTER DAMAGES CLAIMS 9 (1990); KENT ROACH,
CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES IN CANADA § 11 (1994). But see David J. Mullan, Damagesfor
Violation of ConstitutionalRights-A False Spring?, 6 NAT'L J. CONST. L. 105 (1995) (adopting
a less optimistic view).
132. See Mr. Justice Robert J. Sharpe, Commercial Law Damages: Market Efficiency or
Regulation of Behavior?, in SPECIAL LECTURES 2005: THE MODERN LAW OF DAMAGES 327, 348
(2005).
133. See John D. McCamus, Restitution as an Alternative to Damages in Contract and Tort,
in SPECIAL LECTURES 2005: THE MODERN LAW OF DAMAGES 123 (2005).
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the common law's incremental methodology.'34 Nevertheless, it
would appear that instrumentalist accounts of private law are on the
ascendance. 35
'
C. THE REMEDIAL PERSPECTIVE AND THE
COMPENSATION PRINCIPLE

The evidence of current Anglo-Canadian practices outlined in
Part B suggests that there are at least five ways in which the term
compensation is loosely interpreted as conveying substantive
content.
First, there is the compensation of a victim's real losses that
flow from an action for which the wrongdoer is legally held
responsible. This is the paradigmatic breach of contract or tort case.
Second, there is the compensation for a victim's real loss that
flows from an action of the wrongdoer but for which the wrongdoer
is not held legally responsible. Because of other rules relating to
causation, remoteness, limits on the type of loss recoverable, or a
lack of substantive liability foundation (e.g. absence of fault); there is
no liability in law. This is a problematic category. The victim incurs
a real loss, but the causative link to the defendant is weak or too
remote. Adjustment to establish doctrine has often occurred here.
The reason to change causation and remoteness principles may
reflect a different level of moral obliquity, as in the laws governing
fraudulent misrepresentation.'36 They may be altered because of
problems concerning the ability of a claimant to establish liability to
meet evidential proof levels where the evidential science lacks the
ability to go beyond probability.'37 But the primary objective
remains compensation.
Third, there is the compensation for a victim's real loss that
flows from a distributional imbalance in the relationship between
proto-victim and proto-wrongdoer. This covers losses of a systemic
kind for which the wrongdoer is not directly causally responsible but
134. Sharpe, supra note 132, at 328-33; McCamus, supra note 133, at 136.
135. Cane, supra note 12, at 204.
136. See generally Doyle v. Olby (Ironmongers) Ltd., (1969) 2 Q.B. 158 (U.K.) (involving
damages for fraudulent inducement).
137. For example, see the contrasting positions in Cook v. Lewis, [1951] S.C.R. 830 (Can.),
and Fairchildv. Glenhaven FuneralServ. Ltd., (2003) 1 A.C. 32 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.)

(U.K.), which both deal with the situation where there is more than one potential tortfeasor, for
which only one can have caused the harm, but for which it is impossible to prove which one.

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:91

indirectly has enjoyed a benefit. This kind of compensation
commonly occurs in personal injury assessments based on a variety
of contested systemic discriminatory practices and is a much
contested category.
For example, consider the arguments surrounding the use of
gendered income tables to assess compensation for loss of working
capacity. These tables replicate current income levels that in turn
reflect the product of systemic gender discrimination. A number of
commentators have called for the use of either male specific or
gender-neutral income tables;'38 however, such an approach would
not be in accordance with the principles of corrective justice.139
Because there is no causal connection between that particular aspect
of the harm suffered and the tortfeasor's wrong, the use of genderneutral tables lacks the corrective justice requirement of correlativity.
To mount such a claim would require the sufferer to demonstrate a
normative right to gender equality that imposes a commensurate duty
to oblige on the individual tortfeasor. But if such a right did exist,
then there is no reason to make its recognition parasitic on the
occurrence of a tortious accident, for such a right would then exist to
support a claim brought by any woman against any man to
compensate for the effects of gender discrimination. 140
Fourth, as traditionally found in unjust enrichment,
compensation for a victim can be measured by the real gains made
by the wrongdoer at the expense of violating the victim's rights. If
the wrongdoer's gain is commensurate to the victim's loss, or what
has been termed by some autonomous restitution,' 4 1 the
138. See Cassels, supra note 69, at 167; Adjin-Tetty, supra note 69, at 316-17; Elaine
Gibson, The Gendered Wage Dilemma in Personal Injury Damages, in TORT THEORY 185, 20711 (Kenneth D. Cooper-Stephenson & Elaine Gibson eds., 1993); Mitchell McInnes, The
Gendered Earnings Proposal in Tort Law, 77 CAN. B. REV. 152, 176-79 (1998).
139. See McInnes, supra note 138, at 171.
140. Canadian courts are currently experimenting with a number of approaches to deal with
gender discrimination and its effect on damages for lost working capacity. Some use male
income tables but then apply a negative contingency deduction to reflect that full pay parity is
still to emerge. Others have moved toward blended income tables, while other courts continue to
use female income tables but then allow a positive contingency to be added to an award reflecting
a change in societal treatment toward pay parity. See MacCabe v. Westlock Roman Catholic
Separate Sch. Dist. No. 110, [2001] 293 A.R. 41,
87-89 (Can.). Also note where male earning
tables have been used, the court has then deducted a negative contingency to reflect that pay
parity is still to be attained. In MacCabe, the Alberta Court of Appeal found that the difference
between using female and male income tables amounted to $158,733 on a total claim in excess of
$4 million. Id. f93.
141. See Peter Birks, The Law of Restitution at the End of an Epoch, 28 W. AUSTL. L. REV.,
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compensation is, in effect, like the first type of compensation
described above. If there is no commensurate loss by the victim,
what has been termed disgorgement for wrongdoing occurs, and the
award is being imposed to effect a policy different from that
underlying compensation. 42' If the gain is made from dealings with
the victim's property, that also is like the first type of compensation.
The gain resembles the first type of compensation not because it falls
within the Waddams and Sharpe "lost opportunity to negotiate" line
of reasoning but because it is commensurate with the incidentals of
what constitutes property, namely, the right to exclusive enjoyment,
including the possibility of gain.143
Finally, compensation for a victim can be measured by the need
to regulate the wrongdoer's conduct by imposing punishment,
deterrence, or retribution. Here, compensation is a contingent
interest, interacting with the desire to effect punishment, deterrence,
or retribution, only to the extent of what is the quantifiably necessary
amount to achieve the instrumental goal. For clarity, I will refer to
the different methods of compensation as 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5,
respectively.
How do the theories of private law outlined in Part A align with
these characterizations of compensation? Economic instrumentalism
and revenge accounts focus only on 4 (disgorgement for
wrongdoing) and 5. Corrective justice accounts focus on the 1, 2,
and 4 (autonomous restitution, and property misappropriation).
Consequential accounts identify how the normative principles that
are implicit in 1, 2, and 4 exacerbate the distributional imbalance
revealed in 3. The law of court orders either removes the
compensation principle entirely from discussion, it being a
substantive secondary right, or neutralizes the compensatory
principle as a defining characteristic of private law.
Apart from economic instrumentalism, the majority of other
accounts accept the concept of correlativity as locating one boundary
of private law, and as described above, this is a constitutive feature
of corrective justice accounts. Disagreement exists with respect to
14, 19 (1999).
142. See Mitchell Mclnnes, The Measure of Restitution, 52 U. TORONTO L.J. 163, 181-86
(2002); Lionel D. Smith, The Province of the Law of Restitution, 71 CAN. B. REv. 672, 695-99
(1992).
143. See Waddams & Sharpe, supra note 121; Weinrib, supra note 39.
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the categorical nature of corrective justice. Corrective justice does
much to inform on the content of a duty between victim and
wrongdoer, but it does little to identify when and where such a duty
should be created.'" Economic instrumentalist accounts are much
clearer on the ability to offer prescription here because they are
united around a singular concept of efficiency.' 45 This is not to level
a particular attack at corrective justice, as it is a common feature of
most jurisprudential accounts; they provide description rather than
prescription, at least not at any level that can give hortatory guidance
to shape when a new emerging cause of action should be initiated or
doctrinal principle changed. 146
As the primary competitor to economic instrumental accounts, I
now focus on corrective justice. I accept the criticism that both Peter
Cane and Ken Cooper-Stephenson have levelled at corrective justice
and their suggestions that in order to be useful, any prescriptive
theory of private law must make allowance to redress some
distributional imbalances and not simply give a narrative account of
distributive justice. A modified theory of private law is crucial to
resolve the content of 2, 3 and part of 4 (autonomous restitution)
with respect to the role that the compensation principle plays.
Engagement of the compensation principle marks the point of
demarcation between the violation of legal rights that engage
compensation, and the violation of rights that warrant vindication,
namely part of 4 (disgorgement for wrongdoing) and 5. Incidentally,
the division suggested here is one alluded to by Lord Scott when
defining the only legitimate purposes for an award of damages in a
civil suit: "one is compensation for loss or damage caused by
wrongful conduct; the other is vindication of a right that has been
violated by wrongful conduct."' 47

144. This is more of a problem for Weinrib than Coleman, the latter only offering an account
of tort law.
145. See SMITH, supra note 16, at 132-36; Craswell, supra note 17, at 1149-71.
146. For example, what theoretical account predicted the adoption of the remedial
constructive trust in co-habitation cases, Pettkus v. Becker, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 834 (Can.), or the
collapsing of the distinction between mistake of law and mistake of fact in the United Kingdom in
Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. Lincoln City Council, (1999) 2 A.C. 349 (H.L. 1998) (U.K.).
147. Lord Scott, supra note 123, at 1.
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Mapping the contours of the intersection of corrective and
distributive justice is a work in progress.'48 The scope of this
engagement is at a highly abstract and metaphysical level and usually
extends to offer explanatory accounts of various aspects of private
law.'49 At this level, it provides little pragmatically for courts to use,
and yet Canadian and English courts have explicitly signalled that
this is a project that they are already engaged in. 5 '
A pragmatic approach to private law and distributive justice
must first determine the range of its concerns.
Litigation,
correlativity, and compensation tend to coalesce around the
distribution of benefits and burdens of economic activity among
individuals within society.
In contrast, litigation, correlativity, and damages
vindicating
rights of citizenship coalesce around the distribution of participatory
rights in the polity. For example, do prisoners have voting rights?
What are the constitutional rights accorded immigrants and refugees?
And, even here, more often remedies are characterized by their
declaratory or mandatory form, as in injunctions, than being
substitutional, as in damages. Even in the limited range ascribed
here that engages compensation, distributive justice means to
exercise choice over the allocation of benefit and burdens of
economic activity. For a court, there must be legitimacy to this
exercise, so it can maintain the claim that it is acting justly, and to
differentiate the project of law from politics. Unlike legislatures that,
up to the limits of constitutionality and parliamentary procedure, can
exercise any distributive justice choice, courts require some markers
148. See Tsachi Keren-Paz, Private Law Redistribution, Predictability, and Liberty, 50
MCGILL L.J. 327 (2005), and the collection of essays in 92 VA. L. REV. (2006), particularly,
Kevin A. Kordana & David H. Tabachnick, On Belling the Cat: Rawls and Tort as Corrective
Justice, 92 VA. L. REV. 1279 (2006), and Arthur Ripstein, PrivateOrder and PublicJustice: Kant
and Rawls, 92 VA. L. REV. 1391 (2006). In tort law, see the collection of essays in PHILOSOPHY
AND THE LAW OF TORTS (Gerald J. Postema ed., 2001); Hanoch Dagan, The Distributive
Foundation of CorrectiveJustice, 98 MICH. L. REV. 138 (1999); Gregory C. Keating, Distributive
Justice and CorrectiveJustice in the Law ofAccidents, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 193 (2000).
149. The predominant accounts build upon JOHN RAWLS & ERIN KELLY, JUSTICE AS
FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT (Harvard Univ. Press 2001) (1958).
150. In Canada, see the justificatory process by which a duty of care in tort is to be expanded
in Hercules Mgmts. Ltd. v. Ernst & Young, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 165 (Can.); Cooperv. Hobart, [2001]
3 S.C.R. 537 (Can.); L.(H.) v. Canada (Att'y Gen.), [2005] 1 S.C.R. 401 (Can.). In the United
Kingdom, see Fairchildv. Glenhaven Funeral Services, [2002] UKHL 22, (2003) 1 A.C. 32
(U.K.); Barker v. Corus UK Ltd., [2006] UKHL 20, (2006) 2 A.C. 572, $ 41 (H.L.) (U.K.)
(highlighting the role of fairness in expansion of tort liability in a situation of probabilistic
causation).
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to denote when a political value has crossed the divide into the
firmament of common law consciousness.
Cooper-Stephenson makes the claim that equality, more
specifically gender equality, has made that leap.'51 It is the value that
has fuelled Canadian courts into recognizing the need to adjust the
calculation of prospective income loss for personal injury to
ameliorate the impact of systemic gender inequality.'52 It has
similarly worked to transform the treatment of women in common
law cohabitation dissolution, giving them compensation at least
equivalent to their contribution and thus defeating the presumption
that such work performed during the relationship was done out of
natural love and affection.'53 I have argued elsewhere that the value
accorded multiculturalism may also have made this leap.'54 A
nascent value accorded dignity may also be at work in explaining the
somewhat idiosyncratic treatment of compensatory damages for
wrongful dismissal in Canada.'55
To say that equality, multiculturalism, and dignity have, or may
have entered, common law consciousness, is not to answer why or
how. The why is simply because it appeals to the fulfillment of a
court's sense of justice. This is better left to the metaphysical
arguments, but at a pragmatic level, it is a response to an
overwhelming sense of individual injustice. The hallmark of the
common law is that its doctrine is derived from case-by-case
151. Ken Cooper-Stephenson, Economic Analysis, Substantive Equality and Tort Law, in
TORT THEORY 131, 143 (Ken Cooper-Stephenson & Elaine Gibson eds., 1993).
152. See MacCabe v. Westlock Roman Catholic Sch. Dist. No. 110, 96 Alta. L.R.3d 217,
111 (2001) (Can.); Jeff Berryman, Accommodating Ethnic and Cultural Factorsin Damagesfor
PersonalInjury, 40 U.B.C. L. REV. 1, 15-19 (2007).
153. See Pettkus, 2 S.C.R.,
40-41. Note that this case was decided before Canada enacted
its Charter of Rights and Freedoms; see also Peter v. Beblow, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 980, 119 (Can.)
(describing the argument that labeling a woman's contribution as gratuitous should be rejected
because it "systematically devalues" the contributions women tend to make to the family
economy and has contributed to the s "feminization of poverty"). This is distributive justice writ
large. Commenting upon this case, one of Canada's foremost family law academics described the
Supreme Court's approach as engaging in social engineering and wondered whether this is best
done through private law or better left to legislative reform as a part of public law. Jay McLeod
[1993] 44 R.F.L.3d 396 (Can.).
154. Berryman, supra note 152, at 25-27.
155. True dignity is either held or not held. As such, it is not capable of a monetary
equivalent. The assessment of damages is either as an emolument for the loss, similar to other
non-pecuniary damages, and can thus be spoken of as compensation, or it is a payment to
vindicate the loss of dignity as an absolute right held by all individuals and should be treated as
damages for vindication. See Berryman, supra note 45, at 1547-48.
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methodology. Meticulous attention to facts comes before legal
argument. Disputes arise from an individual's perception of facts
and a sense of injustice and grievance. Lawyers transform these into
evidence and legal arguments. They choose whatever legal tools are
available. Judges determine facts and transform legal tools into
doctrine. Where there is a widespread disconnect between individual
perceptions of injustice and doctrine, the common law is brought into
disrepute. The avoidance of disrepute is a powerful motivator for
adopting equality, dignity, or whatever else makes law work to be
56
just.'
The how is easier to answer and indirectly contributes to the
why. The distributive value of equality was not just plucked from
thin air. It commenced with the subjective expectation of injustice
felt by a client. It was framed in the doctrinal argumentation of law
by a lawyer. Where that was found wanting, a different conception
of law was drawn, buttressed from other public documentslegislation and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In addition,
evidence drawn from other disciplines was tendered that
demonstrated the current distributive state of similarly placed
victims. All of this material was commented upon and formed the
courts' judgments that effected the transformation in the cohabitation and the gendered income cases.'57 The courts rendered the
clients' subjective expectations 'legitimate' and reasonable.' 58 A
pragmatic distributive justice account in fact makes a better
explanatory account of these cases and has the potential to offer
useful prescription of private law.'59
156. This would also appear to be the conclusion of some corrective justice proponents who
seek to avoid the task of explaining how, as a matter of private law on corrective justice grounds,
it can be just to order the poorest to compensate the richest for a particular harm done and so
support a manifestly unjust distributional scheme. See Cane, supra note 12, at 216 (describing
the problem for corrective justice proponents).
157. See Peter v. Beblow, [1993] 101 D.L.R 621 (S.C.C.) (Can.). Why else would a court
comment upon how the current state of the law in a particular field had contributed to the
feminization of poverty?
158. I have commented elsewhere on this process.
See Jeff Berryman, Legitimating
'Legitimate Expectations': A Case Study on Filial Responsibility; Can Parents Recover for
Supporting Their Children at University?, in UNDERSTANDING UNJUST ENRICHMENT 383 (Jason
Neyers et al. eds., 2004).
159. The gulf between what law claims to do and what in fact it does do in practice has been
the subject of my colleague W.A. Bogart's work for some time. His conclusions suggest that the
eloquent models outlined in Part A in fact perform very badly even at a descriptive level of the
outcomes of litigation. See particularly his analysis of tort law in chapter four. W.A. BOGART,
CONSEQUENCES: THE IMPACT OF LAW AND ITS COMPLEXITY 111-55 (2002).
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The values of equality, multiculturalism, and dignity are not
distinctly distributive. In fact, arguably they define the relationship
between citizen qua citizen and when violated warrant correction.
However, in such cases the defendant is not guilty of violating the
claimant's rights based on equality, multiculturalism; or dignity;
nevertheless, they are being required to compensate the claimant for
their loss. The locale of a private suit is being used to correct a
systemic loss. The court would be acting instrumentally. In my
example of the use of gendered income tables, what prevents any
woman from suing any man for compensation based on the systemic
wrong of gender discrimination? How can this be right? And, of
course it is not.
But recall, the immediate challenge by critics of corrective
justice is only as to its categorical position. There is no desire to
jettison all of corrective justice. In particular, the requirements of
correlativity, as an explanatory account of private law, should not be
used to replace corrective justice exclusively with distributive
justice. One must still look to legislatures for rampant distributive
justice. This means that the opportunity to practice distributive
justice through compensation is parasitic on a claim that can
otherwise be justified as meeting the procedural linkages of
corrective justice.
This view bears a remarkable similarity to the current rules
operating in Canada governing an award of punitive damages, a truly
distributive exercise. 6 ° The claimant must be the victim of the
punishable conduct and punitive damages are only warranted if, and
only if, the compensatory damages are insufficient to effect
deterrence, punishment, or denunciation. 6 ' This formulation in
effect does much to avoid the spectre of large-scale punitive damage
awards for negligence or product liability in Canada and incidentally
appears to be the direction the U.S. Supreme Court wishes to take. 62
160. Whiten v. Pilot Ins. Co., [2002] 1 S.C.R. 595 (Can.) (awarding punitive damages against
insurer for its breach of contract and bad faith in refusing to reimburse the insured after a fire had
destroyed his home). In Canada, see the justificatory process by which a duty of care in tort is to
be expanded in Hercules Mgmts. Ltd. v. Ernst & Young, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 165 (Can.); Cooper v.
Hobart, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 537 (Can.); L.(H.) v. Canada (Att'y Gen.), [2005] 1 S.C.R. 401 (Can.).
161. Whiten, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 595.
162. See Phillip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 355-57 (2007) (overruling the award
of punitive damages which punish a defendant for harms perpetrated on other non-parties to the
proceedings).
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The instrumentality being practiced here is of a limited scope. The
claimant is required by the compensatory principle to concretize his
or her distributive losses in a very real way, and in a way quite
different from an economic instrumentalist account. The claimant
and the court are unconcerned with determining an amount which
will signal the right behavioural correction. The justification for a
court to act instrumentally on occasion in the fashion suggested here,
is that the universality of the values being compensated simply
warrant it. It would be wrong for the court to be party to
perpetuating this particular and obvious distributive injustice. The
court cannot ignore the fact that its judgment speaks beyond the
litigants and addresses deeply held societal values.
A remedial perspective linked to the compensation principle
creates clearer demarcations of the tasks at hand. Consider the
development of what has become known as the Wallace factors in
wrongful dismissal disputes.'6 3 The substantive law being addressed
was a breach of contract."6 The particular plaintiff's loss was the
expected employment income for a reasonable termination notice
period and the non-pecuniary damages suffered as a result of a
number of actions by the employer when dismissing the plaintiff.'65
Justice McLachlin, speaking for the minority, would have only
extended the damages recoverable where the manner of dismissal
impacted upon the employee's abilities to secure subsequent
employment.'6 6
McLachlan is approaching
the damage
quantification from a remedial perspective and elevates the centrality
of the compensation principle. It gives value to an employee's
expectations about how they should be treated when being dismissed
but only to the extent that it actually has caused the employee a real
loss. The minority's approach is nuanced in how it indirectly leads
to behavioural modification of employers because it remains plaintiff
centric in determining a real loss.'6 7
In contrast, Justice Iacobucci, speaking for the majority,
extended the reasonable notice period in recognition of an
employee's right to expect good faith and fair dealing in the manner
163.
164.
165.
166.

Wallace v. United Grain Growers Ltd., [1997] 3 S.C.R. 701 (Can.).
Id.
Id.
Id. 110 (McLachlin, J., dissenting).

167. Id.

118-19.
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of dismissal and then identified a number of factors that primarily
focus upon the employer's conduct, rather than the impact this
conduct has on the employee.'68 Thus, as the majority's response
was explicitly directed at effecting behavioural modification of
employers, it is defendant-centric. Such decisions are characterized
by the language of defining rights, and the damages awarded are as
much to do with vindication of those new rights as with
compensating for real loss.'69
The compensation principle plays an important controlling role
because it conditions any claim by requiring an actual provable loss.
It also clearly defines the difference between compensation (1, 2, 3,
and the part of 4 involving autonomous restitution) and vindication
(the part of 4 involving disgorgement for wrongdoing and 5).
Wrongs that justify disgorgement, deterrence, and punishment are
clearly instrumental and potentially distributive in effect. They use
the plaintiff as a windfall recipient of a profit or gain to affect some
other societal objective. The rationale for why private law needs to
attend to greater regulation of conduct needs articulation. Rather
than simply concluding that such goals are at odds with a corrective
justice account of private law, explicit recognition of the
instrumental function of these remedies will directly focus the task at
17
hand.
The effect of weakening the prescriptive ability of corrective
justice as a unified theory of private law by questioning its
categorical foundation is a trade-off to make it a better explanatory
account of what courts actually do. It preserves most of the
structural elements of corrective justice but raises serious issues
about institutional competence and the reach of courts. Courts are
not legislatures, yet they are entrusted with the care of the common
law that provides background rights for much of society's private

168. Id.

107-09.

169. Id. 1 10.
170. Anglo-Canadian accounts on the role of punishment in private law is quite at odds. The
United Kingdom has taken a distinctly antagonistic approach to these damages as being part of
private civil law. See Rookes v. Barnard, [1964] A.C. 1129, 1226-28 (H.L.) (appeal taken from
Eng.) (U.K.); Kuddis v. Chief Constable for Leicestershire Constabulary, (2001) 3 All E.R. 193
(H.L.). Canadian approaches are much more sympathetic, although punitive damages are still
seen as extraordinary. See Whiten v. Pilot Ins. Co., [2002] 1 S.C.R. 595, 1 36-45 (Can.).
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behaviour and actions. There are limits to what courts should do,
and mistakes will be made along the way.'71
CONCLUSION

Economic instrumental accounts give only a contingent role to
the compensation principle. They are more preoccupied with
sending appropriate market signals. The corrective justice critique of
private law does accord the compensation principle a pivotal role,
but is found deficient as an explanatory account partly because of its
rigid categorical structure.
Anglo-Canadian cases increasingly
appear to be engaged in making awards that are more instrumental of
other behavioural modifying goals, yet still framing these within the
terminology of compensation.
In the Anatomy of Private Law Theory, Peter Cane commented

that "debates about the relationship between corrective and
distributive justice will need to continue for some time to come if an
equilibrium of scholarly opinion is to be reached."' 72 Elsewhere,
Cane has suggested that this debate should commence from looking
at the substance of tort law.'73 Whereas, I suggest that this debate can
171. For example, consider the reasoning of the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada in
Hodgkinson v. Simms, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 377 (Can.), where the court held that an accountant who
had given advice on how to minimize taxes was responsible for all the client's losses when the
accountant failed to disclose to the client that he was similarly acting for a development
company,in which he suggested the client invest to reduce his taxes. The tax advice was in fact
sound. The client's losses flowed from deterioration in the economy and the residential property
market. The majority in effect treated the accountant as if he was guilty of fraudulent conduct
and applied a more generous causation rule, but without any evidence of fraud being present. Id.
The ostensible reason for doing so was to keep the fiduciary up to the mark. However, no
evidence was offered to suggest that similarly placed accountants were seriously engaged in
advantage-taking of this type. In other words, the court acted on its own preconceptions about
risks of those who render financial advice. I believe this was an error. See Berryman, supra note
110. Contrast this with the decision of the majority in LAC Minerals Ltd. v. InternationalCorona
Resources Ltd., [1989] 2 S.C.R. 574 (Can.). The court awarded a constructive trust over gold
bearing property that the defendant had acquired after entering into negotiations with the claimant
who had suggested a joint venture. The claimant had completed survey work that demonstrated a
real prospect of gold being found, and had shared this information with the defendant while
attempting to negotiate the joint venture. The defendant utilized this information and acquired the
property for itself. Upon an action for breach of confidence and fiduciary duty, the majority
carefully analyzed the parties relationship, including a review of the industry practice associated
with sharing information between geologists of competing mining companies, and the degree to
which one party shared confidence with the other and why particular legal vehicles were not
employed to ensure the maintenance of those confidences. The court's order reinforced the
industry practice, for which there was a good reason to encourage, that information shared
between geologists was to be kept confidential.
172. Cane, supra note 12, at 217.
173. Cane, supra note 56, at 415-16.
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also be engaged from a remedial perspective, determining what is
experienced as a loss and how it is to be measured. A remedial
perspective adopts the dualist acceptance that rights and remedies are
inextricably linked, each informing the other. To suggest, as I do,
that a wrongdoer could be held liable to pay compensation for a
distributive loss he has not caused but that is parasitic to a loss he has
caused, will appear to many as highly radical. But other theories of
private law, apart from corrective justice, already tolerate this form
of outcome. Economic instrumental accounts positively embrace the
notion, while court order accounts of remedies law would potentially
legitimate all court practices provided they operated within some
internal doctrinal coherence.
I have not sought to argue what normative principles will be
derived from a particular theory of distributive justice nor how they
will be coherently reconciled with what is institutionally legitimate
for courts to do, although I do believe that one source of fruitful
inquiry will be on what makes individual expectations reasonable
and legitimate. The likely conditions where my attenuated approach
will initially operate are where the judgment debtor's (defendant)
loss is being born by insurance and where the plaintiffs parasitic
claim is the product of some form of systemic discriminatory
practice, i.e., what is already emerging in the gender income cases.'74
174. Another potential candidate is in the area of collateral benefits. In B.(M.) v. British
Columbia, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 477 (Can.), the plaintiff had been the victim of sexual abuse while in
the care of foster parents that she had been placed into after being removed from her birth parents
by her social worker. In a suit against both the foster parents and the social services agency for
failing to supervise the foster parents, the plaintiff sought damages for the adverse impact the
injury had on her ability to earn income. At the time of the suit the plaintiff was in receipt of
social assistance. One of the issues before the court was whether the social assistance should be
regarded as a collateral benefit, to be deducted from any damages award for lost opportunity to
earning capacity. The case was decided on the liability question. However, the court addressed
the collateral benefit issue, holding that social welfare payments should be deducted. This result
seems fair from a policy point of view that encourages the lowering of personal injury damages.
However, it seems distinctly unfair in that a welfare recipient is required to account for the receipt
of social assistance, but had the person been in the fortunate situation of providing through
insurance or from charity for the adverse impact the abuse had on employment, they would have
benefited from the insurance or charity exception to the collateral benefit. Since the more
fortunate in society are likely to have employment and thus have some form of replacement
income insurance, they will benefit from expanded exceptions to the collateral benefit rule.
Whereas, the least fortunate, who are unlikely to have employment or carry insurance, bear the
full brunt of the collateral source rule. I am not arguing the result in this case is wrong; however,
the application of the collateral source 'ule does raise significant issues for progressives, who
mostly argue in favor of a deductibility rule against a backdrop of increasing withdrawal by the
state. The dilemma is expressed in Richard Lewis, Deducting CollateralBenefits from Damages:
Principle and Policy, 18 LEGAL STUD. 15, 39-40 (1998):
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Here, I suggest that the compensation principle still has an
important constitutive part* to play in a theory that draws on the
structural elements of corrective justice, combining these elements
with some elements of distributive justice, without necessarily
having to embrace economic instrumental accounts of private law.
At a minimum, my attenuated approach reinforces the demarcation
between gains-based and loss-based awards, and it still limits the
extent that a court can order a defendant to pay damages to a
claimant. A claimant still has to prove in concrete ways the damages
she has suffered and that they are causatively attributed to a now
illegitimate social practice derived from the common law.
Reasserting the centrality of the compensation principle will curb
excessive judicial zeal, which seeks to embrace a more
instrumentalist goal for the common law as a way to regulate private
conduct.

[S]hould a welfarist reviewing the tort system support cuts in damages now in the hope
of the more equitable reallocation of resources at some later date, or should a defense
be mounted of the existing level of support given to the fortunate few who succeed in
their common law claim?
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